We study an agent-based stock market model with heterogeneous agents and friction. Our model is based on that of [9] : the process of a stock price in a discrete-time framework is determined by temporary equilibria via agents' excess demand functions, and the diffusion approximation approach is applied to characterize the continuous-time limit (as transaction intervals shorten) as a solution of the corresponding stochastic differential equation (SDE). In this paper we further make the assumption that some of the agents are bound by either short sale constraints or budget constraints. Then we show that the continuous-time process of the stock price can be derived from a certain SDE with oblique reflection. Moreover we find that the short sale (respectively, budget) constraint causes overpricing (respectively, underpricing).
Introduction
It is usual in mathematical finance to describe the price evolution of a risky asset such as a stock by a diffusion process. Geometric Brownian motion (GBM) is one of the most standard such processes for price fluctuation. Because of its simplicity and convenience, the GBM model is widely used in the context of option pricing/hedging, optimal investment, and many other financial problems. An important theme is to justify GBM from the economic viewpoint. For instance, a heuristic equilibrium argument for GBM is discussed in [20] . The justification of GBM as the rational expectations equilibrium is discussed in [2] and [15] .
Recently there have been various studies of agent-based market models to explain the fluctuation of a price process. One representative study is the microeconomic approach of [8] and [9] : The process of the stock price is first given as a sequence of temporary price equilibria in a discrete-time market model with heterogeneous agents and then the price process in a continuous-time model is derived as the limit as the transaction time intervals shorten. Let us introduce the outline of the model of [9] . Let I be the set of agents in the market andê n,i k (p, ω) be trader i's excess demand function for a proposed stock price p at the time k/n, where n ∈ N and trades are executed at times t = 0, 1/n, 2/n, . . .. The parameter ω is a sample point in the underlying probability space (Ω, F, P ). The stock price process (S n k/n ) k=0,1,2,... is given as follows: At the initial time t = 0, the stock price is given by S n 0 = s 0 . Then agents exhibit their excess demandê n i,0 (·, ω) and the next price is determined as a temporary equilibrium, that is, the solution p * of ∑ i∈Iê n i,0 (p * (ω), ω) = 0.
After transactions at t = 0, the stock price changes to S n 1/n = p * . Similarly, during the trading period k/n, the stock price before transactions is given by S n k/n and agents' excess demands (ê n,i k (·, ω)) i∈I make the stock price change to S n (k+1)/n . Finally, the process (S k (e x , ω) and x 0 = log s 0 . In [8] and [9] , the individual excess demand function e n,i k is assumed to be given by k (x) is the reference level of agent i, and F i is agent i's individual perception of the fundamental (log-)value. For a more precise economic interpretation of (1.3), see Example 3) in Section 2 of [9] . In this case, (1.2) can be rewritten using the stochastic difference equation Let (X n t ) t≥0 be an interpolated process of (X n k/n ) k such as either X n t = X n k/n t ∈ (k/n, (k + 1)/n) (1.5) or X n t = (nt − k)X n (k+1)/n + (k + 1 − nt)X n k/n t ∈ (k/n, (k + 1)/n). (1.6) Then, under some mathematical assumptions, the process (X n t ) t converges to an OrnsteinUhlenbeck (OU) process of the form
(This is a simplified version of the result of [9] : They also treat an OU process in a random environment.) This implies that the continuous-time stock price S t = exp(X t ) is a geometric OU process.
It is meaningful to consider the above diffusion approximation approach to derive the continuous-time process in a more general framework. A diffusion approximation for solutions of stochastic difference equation in the following form
with E [F n k (x)] = 0, is studied in [17] and [23] - [25] under some mixing conditions. In [13] , a case of the functional difference equation
is studied under strong mixing conditions and a certain additional dimensional condition. By using these results, we can apply the diffusion approximation approach to the agent-based market model for more general excess demand functions and derive several stock price models based on the framework of [9] . The aim of this paper is to construct an agent-based model of stock prices with market liquidity problems. In the real market, although there are agents who can buy and sell the stock freely to some extent, there also exist agents who cannot trade to their own satisfaction because of a shortage of cash, being prohibited from short selling, and so on. To consider how such a liquidity problem affects things, we construct a market model based on [9] under the following constraints:
(I) Some of the agents cannot sell the more of the stock than the number of shares held (a short sale constraint), (II) Some of the agents cannot buy more of the stock higher than allowed by their budget.
(a budget constraint).
In each case (I)-(II), we will show that the continuous-time process of the stock price which is derived by shortening the transaction intervals is the solution of a certain stochastic differential equation with oblique reflection (SDER). Moreover, the value of the stock price under the short sale constraint is larger than it would be without such a constraint. The effect of the short sale constraint is discussed in [1] , [5] , [10] and the references therein, and our result is consistent with a common expectation, viz., that the short sale constraint causes overpricing (nonetheless, [1] pointed out that whether short sale constraints will always lead to overpricing is far from certain). On the other hand, we will also show that a budget constraint drives the stock price down. We now fix some notation. For an interval A ⊂ [0, ∞), we denote by C(A; R d ) the set of continuous functions from A to R d and we use the abbreviations 
Main Results

Model I: Stock Price Model with Short Sale Constraints
Let I = {1, . . . , N } be a finite set of agents who are active in the market which consists of a single stock. We assume that each agent i ∈ I always stays in the market and no new agents enter. First we consider the discrete trading case, with market clearing times t = 1/n, 2/n, . . . for n ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. We denote by X n = (X n t ) t≥0 the log-price process of a stock, and by φ n,i = (φ n,i t ) t≥0 the number of shares of the stock held by agent i ∈ I. The fluctuations of the processes X n and φ n = (φ n,i ) N i=1 are found as follows. At the initial time t = 0, every agent i ∈ I has φ n,i 0 = Φ i ≥ 0 shares of a stock and the initial log-price of the stock is X n 0 = x 0 ∈ R. After trading is finished for the period t = k/n, the log-price X n t , t ∈ (k/n, (k + 1)/n] is determined by the market clearing condition ∑ i∈I e n,i
and linear interpolation (1.6), where e n,i k (x, w, ω; φ) : R×C×Ω n ×R −→ R is the excess demand function of i ∈ I at t = k/n on the underlying probability space (Ω n , F n , P n ), and φ n,i k is the quantity of stock held by i. Here e
After determining the log-price up to t = (k + 1)/n by (2.1), the agents' holdings of the stock are set by
for i = 1, . . . , N . We remark that (2.1) implies that the total number of shares of the stock in the market is constant, i.e.,
Φ i for any n and t.
All agents have their individual excess demandẽ n,i k (x, w, ω) before considering friction, but they do not always exhibitẽ 
Agents in the first group are prohibited from selling short, thus their excess demand at t = k/n is not lower than φ n,i k/n and the process of their stock holdings is always non-negative. Agents in the second group I 2 are allowed to sell short, so they can exhibit the valueẽ
n , ω) itself as their excess demand. Then the excess demand function is finally defined as
The function g n,i
k (w) is the excess demand when the price of the stock does not change. We further divide g
is an additional excess demand associated with the change of the price. Usually the higher the stock price becomes, the lower is an agent's demand for the stock. Thus it is natural that f n,i k (x, w) is supposed to be decreasing in x. Furthermore, we assume
k (x, w) is deterministic (i.e., independent of ω ∈ Ω n ), continuous in (x, w), and three times continuously differentiable in x. Moreover, there exist positive constants K 0 and δ 0 such that
k (w) are continuous in w almost surely.
Condition [A1] implies that when I 2 is not empty (that is, when N
has a unique solution x for any fixed w and (φ i ) i , since the left-hand side of (2.7) is strictly decreasing in x. In fact, the existence of a unique solution of (2.7) is also guaranteed even if
However, hereafter we always assume N 1 < N for some technical reasons which we will explain later. By (2.1) and (2.2), we can construct the processes (X n t ) t and (φ n t ) t . We are interested in the limit of the
More precisely, we consider the weak limit of the distribution µ n = P (Ξ n ∈ ·) on C 1+N . We will define more conditions.
[A2] For every M > 0, there exists a positive constant C M > 0 such that
for any n, k ∈ N and i = 1, . . . , N , where E n is the expectation with respect to P n (we simply denote this by E when there is no possibility of confusion).
[A3] The σ-algebras σ(ḡ
For each i, j ∈ I the following limits exist
uniformly on any compact subset of C and for any t ≥ 0, and
uniformly on any compact subset of [0, ∞) × C.
where δ ij is the Kronecker delta and
There exists V = (V ij )
. . , N 1 and the spectral radius of V is less than 1.
Note that the inequality
ij is the i, jth element of the mth power of the matrix Q n k (w) and the norm || · || 1 stands for
We now introduce an SDER.
We call the process L = (L i t ) i∈I 1 ,t≥0 a regulator associated with Ξ = (X, φ). Now we present our final assumption.
[A7] A solution of (2.8) is unique in law.
For instance, if ∂f n k /∂x, i = 1, . . . , N , is constant (and so is the matrix Q), condition [A7] holds under a Lipschitz condition on the coefficientsb i andσ ij (see [4] and [19] for instance: although the form of our SDE (2.8) is a little special, the arguments in these papers also works.) For other sufficient conditions for [A7], see [7] and [18] .
By [A7], the distribution µ = P (Ξ ∈ ·) is uniquely determined. We are now prepared to state our main result.
The proof is in Section 3. Theorem 1 implies that the limit of Ξ n = (X n , φ n,1 , . . . , φ n,N ) is characterized as the solution of an SDER, viz., (2.8). The regulator process L prevents the shares of stock of an agent i from taking a negative value. The infinitesimal term 1 I 1 (i)dL i t in (2.8) works only when the agent i ∈ I 1 hopes to sell more of the stock than they hold.
Here we consider the case where all agents in the market can sell short (i.e., N 1 = 0). This is a special case of Theorem 1 of [13] and X n converges weakly to the unique solutionX of
In this case, no agents are bound by the short sale prohibition, and the process (X t ) t represents the log-price of the stock without friction. On the other hand, when I 1 is not empty, agents in I 1 may not be able to exhibit their primary excess demand (which is described asẽ n,i k in the discrete-time model.) The (log-)price X t is pushed up by the gap between the actual excess demand with the primary excess demand, so X t is larger thanX t . The following theorem describes such a phenomenon.
Theorem 2 is easily obtained by similar arguments to the proof of Proposition 5.2.18 in [12] . This suggests the assertion that the short sale constraint causes the overpricing in our model.
Model II: Stock Price Model under Budget Constraint
We also consider the case where some of the agents, I 1 = {1, . . . , N 1 }, cannot borrow cash. In the previous section, an excess demand function with no frictionẽ n,i k (x, w) is understood as shares of the stock which an agent wants to buy. In this section, we interpretẽ n,i k (x, w) to mean an excess demand in terms of dollars. We also define
The market clearing condition is now expressed by
where W n t is the agent's amount of cash held at time t. Then the process of the log-price of the stock (X n t ) t and the cash holdings (W n,i t ) t of an agent i are given by (1.6), (2.13),
and 
, and
where c i ≥ 0 is the initial cash holdings of agent i. Then we have the following theorem. We omit the proofs of Theorems 3-4 since they are almost the same as those of Theorems 1-2. 
Proof of Theorem 1
Take any M > |x 0 | and let ψ M ∈ C ∞ (R; [0, 1]) be such that ψ M (y) = 1 on |y| ≤ M/2 and ψ M (y) = 0 on |y| ≥ M . We set e n,M,i k (x, w) = −(1 − ψ M (w(k/n)))α n,i k (w)(x − w(k/n)) + ψ M (w(k/n))ẽ n,i k (x, w). We define X n,M , φ n,
Proposition 1. For any
We rearrange our market clearing equation into the form of a difference equation. Since it follows that
Substituting (3.1) into itself and into (3.2), we get
X n,M (k+1)/n − X n,M k/n = 1 α n k (X n,M ) { N ∑ i=1 H n,M,i k (X n,M ) + N 1 ∑ i=1η n,M,i k } , φ n,M,i (k+1)/n − φ n,M,i k/n = H n,M,i k (X n,M ) − α n,i k (X n,M ) α n k (X n,M ) { N ∑ j=1 H n,M,j k (X n,M ) + N 1 ∑ j=1η n,M,j k } +1 I 1 (i)η n,M,i k , where H n,M,i k (w) = ψ M (w(k/n)) { 1 √ ng n,i k (w) + 1 n h n,i k (w) } +ε n,M,i k , h n,i k (w) =ḡ n,i k (w) + ψ M (w(k/n)) 2 γ n,i k (w) 2ᾱ n k (w) N ∑ j,m=1g n,j k (w)g n,m k (w), ε n,M,i k = ψ M (X n,M k/n ) { ε n,M,i k + γ n,i k (X n,M ) 2ᾱ n k (X n,M ) 2ε n,M k } , ε n,M k = ( N 1 ∑ i=1η n,M,i k ) { N 1 ∑ i=1η n,M,i k + 2ψ M (X n,M k/n ) N ∑ i=1 ( 1 √ ng n,i k (X n,M ) + ρ n,M,i k ) } +ψ M (X n,M k/n ) 2    2 √ n N ∑ i,j=1g i k (X n,M )ρ n,M,j k + ( N ∑ i=1 ρ n,M,i k ) 2    , ρ n,M,i k = 1 nḡ n,i k (X n,M ) + 1 2 γ n,i k (X n,M )(X n,M (k+1)/n − X n,M k/n ) 2 + ε n,M,i k .
Thus, if we set η n,M,i k
The equality (3.6) seems to imply that (
is a solution of the Skorokhod problem with oblique reflection in the non-negative orthant associated with (Y n,M,i )
(see [4] , [11] , [18] , [19] and [21] ). However this is not strictly true, since the equality 
is, as it were, a solution of the corresponding Skorokhod problem in discrete-time.
Proposition 2. For every
Proof. It is obvious that the left-hand side of (3 .7) is not less than the right-hand side. We suppose
This inequality gives η 
Proposition 3. For every
The equality (3.2) also indicates
The equality (3.9) corresponds to the classical Skorokhod problem for each i = 1, . . . , N 1 . Similarly to Proposition 2, we obtain the following.
Proposition 4. For every
Next we evaluate the moment of the process.
Proof. Set
Then we have f (1) = 0 and
Using the fundamental theorem of calculus, we get
By [A2] and Proposition 1, we have
Our assertion follows immediately by (3.11) and (3.12). ■
The above proposition and [A1]-[A2] lead us to the following.
Proof. It suffices to estimate E [|
, Proposition 4, and the equality , and X n,M t ), we have
[nt]/n , and thus
By [A4] and Propositions 5-6, we have
is a trivial σ-algebra), the Doob inequality implies 
Proof. It suffices to show this forε
Since [A2] and Proposition 5 imply E [ψ
Proof. Our assertion is obtained from [A2], Proposition 8, (3.16) , by calculating
Proof. It suffices to show
for any 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ u ≤ T and for some C M,T > 0 (cf. [14] ). Set Φ = |Ẑ 
and the uniform boundedness of (ξ
for some positive constant C ′ . By [A2] and Proposition 8, we see that
and hence 
for some C ′′′′ M,T > 0. Replacing Φ with 1 and performing the same calculation, we have
The inequality (3.23) immediately leads to (3.18) . The inequality (3.17) is now obtained by (3.24) and the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 14.1 in [3] . ■
As a consequence of Propositions 3 and 10, we can see the tightness of the processes with fixed M .
Proposition 11. A family of processes
Proof. 
for every ε ′ > 0 and T > 0, where w T (δ; x) stands for a modulus of continuity, i.e., w T (δ; x) = sup 0≤s<t≤T,|t−s|≤δ
For a while, we set n sufficiently large so that 1/n < δ. Let 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T be such that
Similarly, Proposition 3 implies
By (3.27), Proposition 6, and the Chebyshev inequality, it follows that
for any ε > 0. Taking lim sup n , letting δ → 0, and applying (3.25), we get
Similarly, (3.27), (3.28), and Proposition 6 imply
for any ε > 0. Furthermore, the inequality
Our assertion is obtained from (3.28)-(3.30) and the fact that the initial values
Then we have
Then the same calculation as (3.16) and Proposition 8 leads us to
[nt] (w) =β M,i (t, w) uniformly on any compact subset of C for all t ≥ 0. Thus, using (3.31), we get (
weakly on C. The convergences (3.35)-(3.36) and the continuous mapping theorem imply that
On the other hand, by 
